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Given that young children are under the control of their parents, if the government has an 
interest in either the welfare or the productivity of the former, it has no option but to act 
through the latter. Parents are, in the ordinary sense of the word, the government’s agents. 
They are agents also in the sense of Principal-Agent theory if the parental action of concern to 
the government is private information. This throws doubt on some established optimal-
taxation results, and gives rise to some new ones. 
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This paper is about the analytical and substantive issues which arise in
the ￿scal treatment of families, as opposed to singles or childless cou-
ples. One has to do with the fact that young children are under the
control of their parents. If the government has an interest in either the
welfare or the productivity of the former, it then has no option but to
act through the latter. Parents are, in the ordinary sense of the word,
the government￿ s agents. They are agents also in the technical sense of
Principal-Agent theory if the parental action of concern to the govern-
ment is private information. Another has to do with the fact that the
children are domestically produced goods in the sense of Becker (1991).
As these goods are not tradeable, a couple￿ s ability to raise children
is then as relevant a di⁄erentiating characteristic as a worker￿ s ability
to produce income. This raises questions of division of labour between
couples.1 It also makes parental decisions separable into a problem of
time allocation between domestic and market activities, and a problem
of income allocation between expenditure on parents, and expenditure
on children. As we will see, separability is of some importance in the
design of optimal policy. Yet another issue has to do with the fact that
the parental actions and characteristics which a⁄ect a child￿ s future in-
come are typically more di¢ cult to observe by a public authority than
those which a⁄ect the agent￿ s own income. Therefore, the potentiality
or actual presence or young children changes the information structure
of the policy problem.
The incorporation of asymmetric information in economic models is
probably the most important theoretical development of the past forty
years. Of particular interest to us here is its incorporation into the the-
ory of optimal taxation at the hands of Mirrlees (1971, 1974), and many
others in his wake. As the observable outcome of concern to the gov-
ernment depends not only on an unobservable action undertaken by the
agents, but also on other unobservable factors, this theory may be seen
as an application of the Principal-Agent model. In one formulation, the
unobservable factors are the agent￿ s personal characteristics. Suppose,
for example, that the government observes how much a worker earns,
but not how much he works. If the government knew the worker￿ s earn-
ing ability, it could deduce the amount of time worked from the amount
of money earned. As it does not, however, all the government can do is
use its statistical information regarding the distribution of this trait in
the population of workers to device a tax-subsidy scheme which will in-
1It also raises questions of division of labour within couples. Given our focus on
parent-child relations, however, we shall not be concerned with that.
2duce the worker in question to reveal his own earning ability. In most of
the existing models, the only hidden characteristic is indeed the agent￿ s
earning ability. Variations on the theme can be found in Bovemberg
and Jacobs (2005), and Hellwig (2008), who examine the case in which
there is still only one hidden characteristic, but this characteristic a⁄ects
either the earning ability of an agent with a given education, or the cost
to the agent of acquiring that education. Balestrino, Cigno and Pettini
(2002, 2003), and Cigno, Luporini. and Pettini (2004), appear to be the
￿rst to have extended the analysis to the case where the agents are cou-
ples di⁄erentiated by two hidden characteristics, namely their earning
ability, and their ability to raise children. This extension gives rise to im-
portant interactions between informational and comparative-advantage
considerations in the design of policy.
In another formulation of optimal taxation theory, the unobservable
factors are random variables with known probability distributions con-
ditional on the agent￿ s hidden actions, and the policy problem is then
to induce the agent to set those actions at the levels deemed optimal
by the policy maker. In most of the existing contributions, the only
hidden action is again the amount of labour supplied by the agent, and
the observable outcome are the agent￿ s earnings. In Cigno, Luporini and
Pettini (2003), by contrast, the hidden action is the amount of money
or own time that a couple invests in a child, and the observable outcome
is the child￿ s (rather than the agent￿ s) lifetime earning and tax-paying
capacity. In principle, there is also another hidden action, reproductive
activity. Like most of the endogenous-fertility literature, however, the
article in question assumes that a couple can deterministically choose
how many children to have. As the number of children is observable,
the government can then get potential parents to have whatever feasible
number of children it deems optimal by imposing what, in the Principal-
Agent literature, is known as a "forcing contract" ￿in plain English, by
threatening parents with a large enough penalty if they have a number
of children di⁄erent from the one prescribed.2 This unsavoury, as well as
unrealistic, feature disappears if the number of children also is treated
as a random variable with known probability distribution conditional on
the agent￿ s unobservable reproductive activity as in Cigno and Luporini
(2006, 2009). The same treatment is reserved by Cremer, Gahvari and
Pestieau (2006, 2008) to the sum-total of the amounts earned by all
the agent￿ s children.3 Either way, if the conditioning action is private
2Of course, the assumption that any type of behaviour can be secured by a large
enough penalty is only a convenient analytical simpli￿cation. Homicide attracts very
severe penalties, but is not entirely deterred by them.
3This implicitly assumes that the probability distribution of the number of chil-
3information, the government cannot use a forcing contract, and must
consequently give would-be parents the incentive to undertake the ac-
tion in question at the socially optimal level. As the properties of the
second-best policy do not change very much compared with the case
where a couple can deterministically choose how many children to have,
however, we will concentrate on the latter.
2 Comparative advantage and the direction of re-
distribution
Before tackling asymmetric information, it is useful to set out the welfare
implications of assuming that some of the goods entering the utility func-
tion of the household members are domestically produced, rather than
bought from the market.4 While obvious once stated, these implications
do not appear to be universally appreciated.








where Xi is a domestically produced good, and Y i a good bought from
the market. The utility function U (:;:), the same for all households, is
increasing and concave. The quantity of domestically produced good




, where Hi denotes the amount of own time,
and Zi the quantity of a market commodity, used as inputs. The
production function F (:;:) is increasing and concave. The positive
constant ￿
i is a domestic productivity parameter. It seems natural















where Li is the labour supply, and !i the wage rate, of household i. Each
household is endowed with one unit of time, so that
H
i + L
i = 1: (3)
Suppose that there are only two, equally numerous, categories of
households. We can then conduct the analysis in terms of the repre-
sentative household of each category, labelled i = 1;2. The two can
di⁄er in the value of ￿, in that of !, or in both. Having assumed that
dren, and the probability distribution of each child￿ s future earnings, are conditional
on the same parental action.
4This section draws on Cigno (2001).
4one of the goods is domestically produced, we cannot allow for the time
of one household to be used in another household, otherwise we might
just as well have assumed that the good is produced by ￿rms. If we
assume that the domestic product of one household can be consumed
by another household, we characterize a Pareto optimum by maximizing












































The precise form in which ￿
i enters the domestic production function
makes a di⁄erence to the analytical results, but does not a⁄ect the gen-
eral drift of the argument. For explicitness, we introduce ￿
i as a factor
that augments the e⁄ectiveness of time employed in domestic production
(in the same way as !i augments the e⁄ectiveness of time employed in


































The ￿rst of these conditions tells us that, in each type of household, the
MRTS of household time for the commodity used as an input in domestic
production must be equated to the relative price. The second says that
the MRS of the market good for the domestically produced good must
be the same in all households.
The assumption that the domestically produced good can be moved
from one household to another suggests that this is something like a
sou› Ø. Some people are better than others at baking it (have a higher
￿), but anyone can enjoy it. That is the assumption in Sandmo (1990).
If there is a perfectly competitive market for sou› Øs, the laissez-faire
5equilibrium is then a Pareto optimum. What if we are talking of children,
rather than sou› Øs? Think of Xi as the number of children in a type-
i household, or as some measure of their aggregate welfare. Then, Xi
cannot be moved from one household to another. That is the assumption
in Cigno (2001), and Balestrino, Cigno and Pettini (2003).








, i = 1;2: (10)
A Pareto-optimal allocation will again satisfy (8) for i = 1;2. But,













2￿ UX (X2;Y 2)
UY (X2;Y 2)
: (11)














The intuition is straightforward. If the domestically produced good can
be moved about, the marginal product of the commodity used as an
input in its production will be equalized across households, and (12) will
always be true. If the domestic product cannot be moved, (12) will be







We shall refer to the allocation that satis￿es (8)￿(9) as a Pareto op-
timum, and to that which satis￿es (8) and (11) as a constrained Pareto
optimum. Since all households buy the market input at the same price
p, (12) implies that money must have the same return in every house-
hold. The government can then induce a Pareto optimum by lump-sum
redistribution.
Let Mi denote a lump-sum money transfer to household i. Suppose
































i; i = 1;2; (14)
and to the government budget constraint,
M
1 + M
2 = 0: (15)
The solution satis￿es (8) ￿ (9): Of all constrained Pareto optima, the
one that is also a Pareto optimum is thus a Benthamite social optimum.
6If we carry out the same optimization with M1 = M2 = 0, we get the
laissez-faire solution. Let us compare this with the social optimum for
various wage and domestic ability con￿gurations.
In the standard income taxation problem, households are di⁄erenti-
ated only by their wage rate. As domestic ability is not mentioned, it















The case is illustrated in Figure 1.
The continuous concave-to-the-origin curve through point SO is the
locus of Pareto optima. In view of (17), this curve is asymmetric around
the 45￿ line. Since type 1 has the comparative advantage, the hump
is on the right. The dotted concave-to-the-origin curve through points
LF￿ and SO is the locus of constrained Pareto optima.5 The straight
line through point SO, with slope equal to minus one, is a Benthamite
social indi⁄erence curve. The point SO, belonging to all three curves,
is the social optimum. Point LF￿, on the constrained Pareto frontier,
is the laissez-faire equilibrium. Since the two household types have the
same ￿, the one with the higher ! has obviously the higher laissez-faire
utility. LF￿ will then lie on the left of the 45￿ line. The socially optimal
policy involves redistribution in favour of low-wage households.






Since (17) is still true, the shape of the frontiers has not changed, but
either type could now have the higher laissez-faire utility.6 If ￿
1 is suf-
￿ciently higher than ￿
2 to more than compensate for the fact that !1 is
lower than ￿
2, the point representing the laissez-faire equilibrium will be
on the right of the 45￿ line. The picture is drawn under the assumption
that ￿
1 is large enough to place this point, labelled LF￿ , not only to the
right of the 45￿ line, but also to the right of SO. The socially optimal
policy now redistributes in favour of high-wage households! But this is
not the only possibility. LF￿could be on the right of the 45￿ line, but
5Be careful not to mistake this for a second-best frontier.
6In trade theory, only comparative advantage matters. In welfare analysis, ab-
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                                                                     Figure 1 on the left of SO, in which case redistribution would be in favour of
low-wage households.
Finally, let us look at the case where one category of households is






Now, the low-wage type has clearly the lower laissez-faire utility, but
either type could have the comparative advantage in domestic produc-








If that is the case, the hump in the two frontiers, and the point SO,
are on the left of the 45￿ line as pictured. Point LF also will be on the
left of the 45￿ line, but it could be on either side of SO. The picture is
drawn under the assumption that type-2 households are so much better
at everything, that LF is on the left of SO. Redistribution is then in
favour of low-wage households. But this is not the only possibility. If
LF were on the right of SO, implying that type 2 is not so much cleverer
than type 1, redistribution would be in favour of high-wage households in
spite of the fact that they have higher laissez-faire utility than low-wage
households.
These exercises make the point that optimal redistribution could have
the e⁄ect of allowing households with a comparative advantage in do-
mestic production to specialize further in that activity as well as, or
rather than, the e⁄ect of reducing inequality. This conclusion requires
some quali￿cation if society dislikes utility inequality, for in that case
the social optimum will be a point between the Benthamite social opti-
mum, represented in ￿gures 1 and 2 by SO, and the 45￿ line. If inequality
aversion is very strong (for example, in the extreme Rawlsian case where
the social optimum is necessarily a point on the 45￿ line), this may ac-
tually change the direction of the redistribution. Otherwise, e¢ ciency
considerations will prevail.
Informational asymmetries may prevent the government from carry-
ing out the socially optimal redistribution, and to this we now turn.
3 Inducing parents to reveal their ability to raise
children
Let us now introduce asymmetric information about household charac-
teristics. Suppose that the government has statistical information about
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                                                                           Figure 2 but does not know the characteristics of any particular household. The
solution proposed by Mirrlees (1971) is to induce households to reveal
their characteristics by o⁄ering them a list of alternative ￿scal menus,
one for each household type (combination of household characteristics).
In a popular formulation of this theory, households are di⁄erentiated only
by their wage rate, and the government observes only their earnings (not
their labour supplies). Each menu then speci￿es the level of household
earnings before and after income-tax, and the set of alternative menus
implies a non-linear income tax schedule.
According to this approach, the government sets up the list of alter-
native ￿scal treatments so as to make social welfare, de￿ned as the sum
of the household utilities, as high as possible within the limits imposed
by the government￿ s own budget constraint, and by the self-selection
constraint that a household of type i must end up worse-o⁄ if it picks
the menu intended for type j. If any of these self-selection constraints
is binding, the solution to the policy optimization is a second best. As
we saw in the last section, if households are only di⁄erentiated by their
wage rate, the government will want to redistribute from high to low
wage households. If that is the case, no household will have an interest
in being taken for a high earner. An implication of the model is thus that
the marginal rate of income tax implicitly charged to top earners will be
zero ("no distortion at the top"). By contrast, the marginal income-tax
rate charged to households with wage rates below the top will have to
be positive in order to discourage mimicking.
Under these assumptions, mimicking requires only adjusting the labour
supply so that the amount earned by the mimicker is equal to that earned
by the mimicked. But suppose that fertility is a choice variable, and that
the government can see how many children a household has. Then, the
mimicker must reproduce not only the income, but also the fertility level
of the mimicked. This makes mimicking harder. Another way in which
children can make a di⁄erence to policy design has to do with the direc-
tion of redistribution. As we saw in the last section, if households are
di⁄erentiated by their ability to raise children as well as by their ability to
make money, the government may want to redistribute from low to high
wage households. As low-wage households are then potential mimickers,
the no-distortion-at-the-top-property need not apply. Furthermore, it
may be optimal for the government to use a policy instrument related to
the number of children in addition to, or instead of a non-linear income
tax. The last two propositions apply whether fertility is endogenous or
exogenous. Balestrino, Cigno and Pettini (2002) examine the ￿rst case,
and allow for di⁄erences in ability to raise children. Cremer, Dellis and
Pestieau (2003) examine the second, but do not allow for di⁄erences
9in ability to raise children. In essence, the assumption that fertility is
endogenous entails a less benign ￿scal treatment of larger families than
the one that fertility is exogenous. It may also make a di⁄erence where
the use of indirect taxation is concerned. Distorting prices by di⁄erential
commodity taxation has in fact a deadweight cost, but may raise welfare
all the same if it raises revenue, or relaxes the self-selection constraints.
The positive e⁄ect may be stronger if fertility is endogenous, than if it
is exogenous.
For the simple case where households are di⁄erentiated by only one
characteristic, and this characteristic is the wage rate, Atkinson and
Stiglitz (1976) show that indirect taxation is redundant if the utility
function is separable in consumption and leisure, and income is optimally
taxed. Kaplow (2006) shows that indirect taxation7 is undesirable even if
the income tax is not optimal.8 What if the di⁄erentiating characteristic
is a personal trait a⁄ecting either the earning ability of an agent with
given education, or the cost of obtaining a given level of education, and
education is a choice variable? In the ￿rst case, Bovemberg and Jacobs
(2005) ￿nd that it is optimal to distort labour decisions through an
income tax, and expenditure decisions through an education subsidy. In
the second, Hellwig (2008) ￿nds that there should not be a distortionary
tax on income, but only a distortionary tax on education. The last
author ￿nds it "bothersome ... that such substantive conclusions should
depend on ... whether a person￿ s ￿ type￿a⁄ects the person￿ s productivity
or the person￿ s cost of attaining a given education level. In general,
an agent￿ s ￿ type￿should be a multi-dimensional characteristic ...". But
that is precisely how it is in Cigno (2001), Balestrino, Cigno and Pettini
(2002, 2003), and Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2004), where households
are di⁄erentiated not only by their ability to make money, but also by
their ability to domestically produce goods. In particular, Balestrino,
Cigno and Pettini (2003) ￿nd that the redundancy-of-indirect-taxation
result does not hold if the goods domestically produced in one household
are not transferable to another. The analysis that follows draws on this
article.
7By this we mean taxation which alters the relative prices of traded goods. Uni-
form taxation of traded goods is equivalent to income taxation.
8Cigno and Pettini (2003) ￿nd that, if an income tax is not available, but the
policy maker can distinguish between goods consumed primarily by adults, and goods
consumed primarily by children, it may be optimal to tax the number of children,
and subsidize the goods they consume.
103.1 Households
Let household preferences be described by a concave utility function,
U = U(N;x;Y;); (21)
where Y is again adult (parental) consumption, and N the number of
children. The second argument, x, may be alternatively interpreted
as a domestically produced commodity consumed by children (Becker,
1991), as the maximized lifetime utility of each child (Becker and Barro,
1988), or as the old-age support that parents expect to receive from each
of their children under some self-enforcing family arrangement (Cigno,
1993, 2006). If we de￿ne
X ￿ Nx;
(21) is a generalization of (1).
Whichever its interpretation, x will depend on the amount of child-
speci￿c commodities, z, and parental time, h, received by each child,
x = x(z;h;￿); (22)
where x(:;:;:) is increasing and concave, and ￿ is again a productivity
parameter, this time representing parental ability to rear children. The
function x(:;￿) is taken to be homogeneous of degree one in (z ￿ z0;h ￿ h0),
with x(z0;h0;k) ￿ 0, where (z0;h0) are the minimum levels of z and h
necessary to bring a child into the world, and keep him or her alive. In
other words, there are constant returns to scale in domestic production
above a certain threshold.
Gross parental income is again given by (2). Since the market input
is bought anonymously, the tax or subsidy on this commodity has to
be the same for everybody. By contrast, since the number of children
in each household is known, it may be optimal for the government to
set a di⁄erent fertility subsidy or tax rate for each household type. The
household budget constraint is
Y + (1 + tZ)Z + tNN = B; (23)
where Z ￿ Nz, tZ is an excise tax on child-speci￿c commodities, and
tN a tax on the number of children. B is parental income net of income
tax. De￿ning H ￿ Nh, the time budget is again (3). The government
observes (B;N;W), but not (h;x;z), and has only statistical information
about the distribution of (￿;!).
The government o⁄ers households a list of alternative (B;W;tN)
triplets, one for each household type, from which to choose, and ￿xes a
common tZ. Parents take their decisions in two stages. First, they ￿nd
11the (H;L;N;X;Y;Z) that maximizes household utility conditionally on
(B;W;tN;tZ). Second, they e⁄ectively declare to be of a certain type by
choosing a (B;W;tN) triplet from those on o⁄er.
A household choosing the (B;W;tN) that was intended for its type
maximizes (21), subject to (3) ￿ (23). The solution satis￿es
UY = ￿; Uxxz = ￿N (1 + tZ);
UN = ￿[(1 + tZ)z + tN] + ￿h; Uxxh = ￿N; (24)
where ￿ and ￿ are the indirect marginal utilities of , respectively, B
and h. Solving (24) together with the constraints yields the household
demand for (N;X;Y;Z) as a function of (B;W;tN;tZ). Substituting
back into the utility function, this gives us the indirect utility func-
tion, V (B;W;tN;tZ;￿;!). We may interpret this as the pay-o⁄to being
truthful.
The indirect marginal utility of income before tax is VW = ￿￿=!.
The negative sign of this expression re￿ ects the fact that a rise in W,
holding w constant, implies a rise in labour supply. The implicit income









The RHS of the ￿rst-order condition for N in (24) represents the
marginal cost of N. Using (25), this term may be re-written as
￿ ￿ z + ￿ + [w ￿ T
0(W)]h; (26)
where
￿ ￿ ztZ + tN
is the e⁄ective tax on the money spent for each child. The cost of an
extra child is thus the sum of an actual expenditure (z + ￿), and an
opportunity-cost (! ￿ T 0)h. If parents give their children only the bare
necessities of life, an additional child costs
￿0 ￿ (1 + tZ)z0 + tN + [! ￿ T
0(W)]h0: (27)
We may think of ￿0 as the ￿xed cost, and (￿ ￿ ￿0) as the marginal cost
of a child. The marginal cost of x is
(￿ ￿ ￿0)N = ((1 + tZ)(z ￿ z0) + [! ￿ T
0(W)](h ￿ h0))N: (28)
Notice that, while the marginal cost of N is a⁄ected by all the policy
instruments, the marginal cost of x does not depend on tN. Therefore, a
12positive tN distorts parental choice away from the quantity of children,
N, and towards their quality, measured by x.9
Let us again suppose that there are only two, equally numerous,
household types di⁄erentiated by the (unobservable) values of ￿ and !,
and de￿ne an ij mimicker as an i-type household wanting to pass for a
j (i;j = 1;2). This household will set the choice variables observable by
the government at the level chosen by the j type. Since the government
sees N, as well as W, an ij mimicker has then no choice of time alloca-
tion. It must devote (W j=!i) units of time to the labour market, and
[(!i ￿ W j)=!i] to looking after children. As already pointed out, this
makes mimicking less attractive than it would be if the mimicker had to
worry only about W.










j (1 + tZ): (29)
The indirect utility function V ij = V (Bj;W j;t
j
N;tZ;￿
i;!i), i 6= j, is the
















Suppose that the government maximizes a concave function of the util-
ities of the two household types. The choice of policy instruments is
restricted not only by the government budget constraint, but also by the
self-selection constraint that neither household type must be better-o⁄
mimicking, than revealing its true characteristics. The policy problem
is to choose (B1;B2;W 1;W 2;t1
N;t2










































































9The language is Gary Becker￿ s. The speci￿c point appears to have been made
for the ￿rst time in Cigno (1986).
13The Lagrange-multipliers associated with these constraints are, respec-
tively, ￿, ￿12 and ￿21.
If neither of the self-selection constraints is binding (i.e., if parents
speak the truth), the solution is a ￿rst best. What this means is that
households ￿nd mimicking not worth the trouble, and that the govern-
ment can thus carry out the desired redistribution using personalized
lump-sum transfers. If either of these constraints is binding, however,
the government has to distort marginal incentives in order to deter mim-
icking, and the solution is then a second best. Which, if any, of the
self-selection constraints will be binding is determined jointly with the
direction of redistribution, and with the optimal choice of policy instru-
ments. In this respect, the presence of domestically produced goods (N
and x) makes a di⁄erence to the analysis.
In conventional optimal income taxation models, it is customary to
impose the "agent monotonicity" condition (Seade, 1982), that ￿VY=VB
is decreasing in the wage rate. When households are di⁄erentiated by
earning ability only, this implies that the indi⁄erence curves are every-
where ￿ atter for high than for low-wage households (￿ single-crossing￿ )
in the (B;Y ) plane. Combining agent monotonicity with the assump-
tion that the policy maker maximizes a convex combination of household
utilities makes sure that the optimal redistribution is in favour of low-
wage households. Since this rules out the possibility that a low-wage
household will ever want to be taken for a high-wage household, one of
the self-selection constraints can be disregarded. This is not legitimate if
households di⁄er also in domestic ability as in the present model, where
one has to allow for the possibility that either household type has an
interest in mimicking.
3.2.1 The direction of redistribution
As in the last section, we shall suppose that !1 < !2, and consider
di⁄erent possibilities regarding ￿
1 and ￿




as in Figure 1. In that case, the comparative advantage in raising chil-
dren rests de￿nitely with low-wage households. If ￿
1 is not su¢ ciently
larger than ￿
2 to give type 1 higher laissez-faire utility than type 2, re-
distribution will be in favour of low-wage households. Then, ￿12 = 0 and
￿21 > 0. If the opposite is true, equity and e¢ ciency pull in opposite
directions, and we cannot say a priori which way the optimal tax sys-
tem will redistribute. In the second case, the direction of redistribution
depends on how strongly the policy maker dislikes inequality (how con-
vex the social indi⁄erence curves are). If the social welfare function is
14Benthamite as in Section 1, it is likely that the e¢ ciency motive will pre-
dominate, and redistribution be in favour of low-wage households even
though this means taking from the worse-o⁄ and giving to the better-
o⁄. Then, (34) will be binding (￿21 > 0, ￿12 = 0) . Redistribution is
more likely to be in favour of high-wage households if the social welfare
function is strictly quasi-concave. If any of the self-selection constraint
is binding, that will then be (33) (￿12 > 0, ￿21 = 0). But the coun-
tervailing e⁄ects of equity and e¢ ciency considerations may require so
little redistribution, that mimicking is not worth the trouble for low-
wage households to pretend to be otherwise. There is then a chance
that neither self-selection constraint will be binding, (￿12 = ￿21 = 0),
and thus that a ￿rst best is achieved.




low-wage households have lower laissez-faire utility than high-wage house-
holds, and may or may not have a comparative advantage in raising
children. If they do, redistribution is de￿nitely in their favour, and (34)
is binding (￿12 = 0, ￿21 > 0). Otherwise, equity and e¢ ciency pull in
opposite directions. Then, redistribution is likely to be in favour of high-
wage households (￿12 > 0, ￿21 = 0) if social preferences are Benthamite,
in favour of low-wage households (￿12 = 0, ￿21 > 0) if social preferences















the total tax bill of a type-i household. We can immediately see that
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i
NNW: (36)
Using the ￿rst-order conditions on the policy optimization, and adapting
a procedure in Edwards, Keen and Tuomala (1994), it can be shown that








































































To interpret these rules, suppose for a moment that t1
N = t2
N =
tZ = 0, so that the second right-hand-side term in each expression is
identically zero. Suppose, also, that type-2 households are interested in
mimicking type-1 (as in Figure 2), but not the other way round (￿21 > 0
and ￿12 = 0). If the indi⁄erence curve of a low-wage household is steeper
than that of a high-wage mimicker in the (B;W) plane, the imposition
of a positive marginal income tax rate on the former will deter the latter
from mimicking. Since type-1 households have no interest in mimicking,
however, there is no point in distorting the decisions of type-2 households
by imposing a positive marginal rate of income tax on them too. In this
particular case, (37) ￿ (38) thus imply T 0(W 1) > 0 and T 0(W 2) = 0 as
in the Mirrlees-Stiglitz model (￿ no distortion at the top￿ ). In general,
however, ￿12 could well be positive, and the marginal rate of income tax
on high earners could thus be positive.
If, in addition to taxing income, the government taxes (subsidizes)
child-speci￿c commodities or the number of children, there is a revenue









meaning that the revenue from taxing commodities and number of chil-
dren falls as the labour supply of type-2 households goes up. Even if
nobody were interested in mimicking high earners (￿12 = 0), imposing a
positive marginal rate of income tax on them would raise tax revenue.
There could thus be another reason, in addition to deterring mimicking,
for distorting labour decisions. This makes it clear that there are two,
quite independent, reasons why the no-distortion-at-the-top proposition
need not hold. One is that, as households are di⁄erentiated by two char-
acteristics, either self-selection constraint could be binding. The other is
that indirect taxation introduces a revenue e⁄ect (Nava, Schroyen and
Marchand, 1996).
3.2.3 Taxing or subsidizing commodities and the number of
children
Using again the ￿rst-order conditions on the policy optimization, and



































N = 0; i = 1;2: (40)
The left-hand-side of (39) is the cost of distorting the demand for
child-speci￿c commodities through tZ and ti
N . If the e⁄ect is nega-
tive (positive), we say that the demand for child-speci￿c commodities
is ￿ discouraged￿ (￿ encouraged￿ ). The right-hand-side represents the
corresponding gain. To see the intuition behind the rule, suppose, for
instance, that true type-1 households spend less, for each of their chil-
dren, than 21-mimickers (￿21 > 0, ￿12 = 0 and z1 < z21). Since V 21
B and
￿ are positive, it is clear that, in this case, distorting prices in favour
of adult-speci￿c commodities would harm mimickers more than genuine
low-wage households. Therefore, the relevant self-selection constraint
can be relaxed by discouraging the purchase of child-speci￿c commodi-
ties. Analogous considerations apply to the other possible cases.
The left-hand-side of (40) is the cost, and the right-hand-side the
bene￿t, of distorting fertility decisions through tZ and ti
N. Since the
bene￿t is zero, these taxes must not distort fertility decisions (though
there may be other reasons, as we shall see in a moment, for distorting
fertility using di⁄erent means). Intuitively, that is because the mimicker
has to produce the same number of children as the mimicked, and dis-
torting fertility choices has thus no ￿ screening power￿ . This rule does
not imply that ti
N = 0. If (39) provides a second-best rationale for taxing
or subsidizing child-speci￿c commodities, the policy prescription is to set
ti
N so that it totally o⁄sets the distortionary e⁄ect of tZ. Thus, (40) im-
plies that tZ and ti
N must have opposite signs if Z and N are Hicksian
complements, the same sign if Z and N are Hicksian substitutes.
Since tZ and ti
N are not the only policy instruments a⁄ecting the cost
of raising children, we can see that by just looking at (26) that (40) does
not imply that fertility will not distorted at a second-best optimum. By
taxing income at the margin, the government does in fact reduce the
opportunity-cost of child bearing. Even if it so happens that tZ = ti
N =
0, the post-tax marginal cost of children will still di⁄er from its pre-tax
level so long as T 0(Y ) 6= 0. So long as child-speci￿c commodities, or
the number of children, are taxed or subsidized, the same is likely to be
true even if T 0(Y ) = 0. Although there is no point in distorting fertility
decisions to discourage mimicking (because children are visible), there
may thus be a point in distorting them for distributional reasons, or in
order to balance the e⁄ects of other distortions.















17where the sign of the second equation follows from (25). For a household
of type i, a child is a tax asset if ￿i
N is negative, a tax liability if ￿i
N
is positive. In ￿rst best, children are clearly tax-neutral for every type
of household because there is no distortionary taxation (Nerlove, Razin
and Sadka, 1993). In second best, however, that will depend on the
number of characteristics by which households are di⁄erentiated, and on
the number of tax instruments available. If households are di⁄erentiated
by the wage rate only, and there is only an income tax, children are tax-
neutral for high earners (the potential mimickers), a tax asset for low-
wage households. With taxes or subsidies on child-speci￿c commodities
or number of children, anything is possible, because ￿i ￿ zitZ + ti
N can
have any sign. The same is true if households are di⁄erentiated by more
than one characteristic, because both ￿i and T 0(W i) can have any sign.
We have thus seen that an optimal policy may include taxes or sub-
sidies on commodities and number of children, in addition to a non-
linear income tax. Does this apply also to the case where the utility
function is separable in consumption and time use? The well-known
Atkinson-Stiglitz theorem says that it does not if households di⁄er only
in their wage rate.10 Balestrino et al. (2003) show analytically that it
does if households di⁄er also in their domestic ability to produce a non-
transferable good. Balestrino et al. (2002) report numerical examples of
cases where it is optimal to tax or subsidize child-speci￿c commodities
and the number of children despite separability of the utility function.
The public debate about tax policy and policies towards the family
often seems to assume that children should be a tax asset to their par-
ents, especially in low-income households. Cremer, Dellis and Pestieau
(2000) show that this is indeed the case if fertility is exogenous, and
households are di⁄erentiated only by their wage rate (as well as by num-
ber of children). But we have just seen that this is not necessarily true
when fertility is endogenous. If parents are di⁄erentiated not only by
their wage rate, but also by their ability to raise children, an extra child
may not reduce the tax bill. Cigno and Pettini (2003) ￿nd the same in
an indirect-taxation context even without child-rearing ability di⁄eren-
tiation.
4 Inducing parents to invest in their children
Let as now interpret x as a child￿ s future earning and thus, for any given
income-tax schedule, tax-paying capacity. Parents may, or may not,
derive utility from x, but the money-equivalent of this utility is in any
case lower than x. There is thus a positive ￿scal externality: an increase
10See Atkinsons and Stiglitz (1976).
18in either N or x relaxes the government budget constraint. Suppose
that x depends on an action (educational investment in the broadest
sense) undertaken by the child￿ s parents, a, and on random variable
(luck). Following Mirrlees (1974), we will treat x itself as a random
variable with known density conditional on action a, f(x;a).11 This
means that a couple can choose the probability distribution, rather than
the actual value of x. The number of children, N, is deterministically
chosen by the parents. Couples are ex-ante identical. The policy problem
is how to provide parents with the incentive to invest at the level desired
by the policy maker, rather than how to induce them to reveal their
characteristics as in the last section. The policy instruments are direct
and indirect subsidies. Although the income-tax schedule is taken as
given, the progressivity of the tax system as a whole, and the direction
of the redistribution will be a⁄ected by the choice of subsidy schedules.12
4.1 Parents
The ex-post utility function of the generic couple,
U = U(Y + v (x)N); (42)
is only a little less general than (21). In the present context, the assumed
concavity of U (:) implies risk aversion. The couple￿ s expected utility is
E(U) =
Z
U(Y + v (x)N)f(x;a)dx: (43)
The total cost of the children is
C = c(N) + z (a)N; (44)
where c(N) is the minimum cost (what, in the last section, we called ￿0)
of raising N children, and z(a) the cost of investing a in each of them.
To ensure concavity of E(U), c(:) and z (:) are assumed increasing an
convex. The household budget constraint is
Y + [m(x) ￿ z(a)]N ￿ c(N) ￿ W; (45)
where W is again parental income, and m(x) is a per-child government
transfer (the negative of what, in the last section, we called tN), possibly
11The standard monotone likelihood ratio (MLR) condition, (
fa
f
) increasing in x,
and the convex distribution function (CDF) condition, are assumed to hold. Since a






in a (Milgrom, 1981).
12The exposition that follows draws on Cigno, Luporini and Pettini (2003).
19conditional on x. If a involves the use of parental time, z(a) will include
the opportunity-cost of this time, and W is then to be interpreted as full
parental income.
Parents choose (a;N) to maximize (43), given (45). The ￿rst-order
conditions are
Z
[m(x) + v(x) ￿ z(a) ￿ c
0(N)]U








Ufa(x;a)dx = 0: (47)
The former says that the couple will procreate to the point where the
expected bene￿t of an additional child equals the cost (zero), the second
that it will invest in each child to the point where the expected marginal
bene￿t equals the expected marginal cost (positive).
4.2 Government
The government maximizes the sum of the expected utilities of all the
couples. As the latter are ex-ante identical, that is the same as maxi-
mizing (43). Assuming that the number of couples, hence the number of
future tax payers, is ￿ large￿ , the government faces no uncertainty over
its future tax receipts, and the budget constraint may then be written
in expected tax revenue terms as
n
Z
[x ￿ m(x)]f(x;a)dx ￿ 0: (48)
Comparing (48) with (45) makes it clear that, in laissez faire, parents
would have no reason to take into account the e⁄ects of their choice of
(a;N) on the government￿ s budget constraint. As a is private informa-
tion, there is then a moral hazard problem where the amount of parental
time and money invested in each child is concerned. As N is observable,
by contrast, the government can use a forcing contract to get a couple
to deliver the desired number of children.
The government will then choose N and m(:) to maximize (43), sub-
ject to its own budget constraint (48), and to the incentive-compatibility
constraint (47). For every possible realization of x, the corresponding
value of m will be determined by the ￿rst-order condition,
U
0f ￿ ￿f + ￿(￿nz
0U
00f + U
0fa) = 0; (49)
where ￿ is the Lagrange-multiplier associated with (48), and ￿ the one
associated with (47).
20As in the hidden-characteristics model, a ￿rst best is again de￿ned
as a solution to the policy optimization problem subject only to the
government budget constraint. There, a ￿rst best would be achieved
if the government could observe the parental type. Here, it would be
achieved if the government could observe a. In ￿rst best, (49) reduces
to U0 = ￿, implying that
m(x) + v(x) = constant: (50)
This says that the government would fully compensate the couple for
having more than the privately optimal number of children, and fully
insure it against the risk of getting low-earning children. This full-
insurance property is typical of ￿rst-best policies. In standard Principal-
Agent models, however, it follows from the assumption that the principal
maker is less risk-averse than the agent. Here, by contrast, the principal
is as risk-averse as the agents, and the result derives from the fact that,
as there are many agents, the government does not face any risk over
future tax revenues.
As a is not observable, however, the government must satisfy the
incentive-compatibility constraint. If (47) is binding, the government
will have to depart from the full-insurance principle, and the solution
will be a second best. It is then convenient to re-write (49) as
￿
U0 = 1 + ￿(nrw
0 + ￿); (51)
where r ￿ ￿U"=U0 is the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion,
assumed constant, and ￿ ￿ (
fa
f
) is a close relative of the likelihood ratio.













0and v0 are positive by assumption;and ￿ and ￿ must be positive
at an optimum, (52) can have any sign. As v0 is decreasing in x, however,
the sign is more likely to be negative if x turns out to be small, positive
if it turns out to be large. Therefore, the second-best subsidy schedule
may well turn out to be U-shaped as in Figure 3 ￿decreasing in x at low
realizations of this variable, where the insurance principle is more likely
to prevail, increasing at high ones, where the incentive principle is more
likely to predominate.
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                                               Figure 3 With regard to fertility, the government will o⁄er parents the follow-
ing forcing contract:
g1 = m(x)N￿ if N = N￿
g2 < g1 if N 6= n￿ ; (53)
where N￿ is the optimal (￿rst or second best) value of N, and g2 low
enough (even zero or negative) to deter anyone from having a di⁄erent
number of children.
4.3 Price subsidies
Let us now see if the government can get any closer to a ￿rst best by
using indirect taxes or subsidies as in the hidden-characteristics model
of the last section. Suppose that a involves the purchase of a certain
commodity, and the use of ￿xed household resources. The assumption
that z0 increases with a may then be justi￿ed by the increasing scarcity
of these resources. For example, if a is measured as number of children￿ s
books, increasing a implies that the parent must divert more time from
work or leisure to reading the books to, or with, the child. If a is mea-
sured as use of an external facility, such as a school or a gym, an increase
in a implies that more parental time, and more of the family car, must
be diverted from other uses to bringing and fetching the child.
Let ￿ denote a subsidy (the negative of what, in the last section,
we called tZ) on the commodity in question. The household budget
constraint then becomes
Y = W + [m(x) ￿ z(a) + ￿a]N ￿ c(N): (54)








Ufa(x;a)dx = 0: (55)
At an optimum, (z0 ￿ ￿) must be positive (otherwise, the agent￿ s utility
could be raised by reducing a).
So far, we have implicitly assumed zero cost of delivering the direct
subsidy. As m was the only policy instrument, that made no qualitative
di⁄erence to the results. The moment we introduce a second policy
instrument, however, it becomes important to compare administration
costs. Let k￿ denote the cost of administering the price subsidy, and km
that of delivering the direct subsidy. Given (54), the government now
maximizes (43), subject to the government budget constraint,
N
Z
[x ￿ (1 + k￿)￿a ￿ (1 + km)m(x)]f(x;a)dx ￿ 0; (56)
22and to the incentive-compatibility constraint (55). Using (59), the ￿rst-
order condition on the government￿ s choice of ￿ may be written as






If k￿ ￿ km, the policy optimization has a corner solution, with only
the price subsidy in use. As the incentive-compatibility constraint will
not be binding, the ￿rst-order condition on the choice of ￿ is then
Z
U
0f(x;a)dx = ￿(1 + k￿): (58)
The government must raise the price subsidy to the point where the
expected marginal bene￿t equals the marginal cost. The intuitive expla-
nation is that, while ￿ is certain, m is uncertain (because it is conditional
on the realization of x). Since parents are averse to risk, the incentive
e⁄ect of a subsidy given through the price system is then larger than that
of an uncertain payment with the same expected value. Doing without
the direct subsidy has the disadvantage that it is not possible to insure
parents against the risk of getting a child with low x. If delivering m
costs as much or more than administering ￿, however, providing this
kind of insurance is not a cost-e⁄ective way of rising social welfare.
If k￿ > km, we get an interior solution, with both policy instruments
in use. As this is a possibility, the redundancy-of-indirect taxation result
is once again refuted. The ￿rst-order condition on the government￿ s
choice of m(:) is now
(1 + km)
￿
U0 = 1 + ￿[(v
0 ￿ ￿)Nr + ￿]: (59)
The slope of the direct payment schedule can again take any sign, but
the indirect subsidy makes it more likely that this will be negative at low
realizations of x, positive at high ones: In other words, the possibility
of providing the investment incentive indirectly through the price sys-
tem (e.g., subsidizing educational services) is an argument for directly
subsidizing very unsuccessful (e.g., educationally subnormal), as well or
instead of highly successful, children.
5 Conclusion
Extending the optimal taxation approach to would-be parents and fam-
ilies with children yields a rich crop of new results, and throws doubt
on some established ones. Among the latter, are the propositions that
indirect taxation is redundant in the presence of an income tax, and that
top wage earners should not have their labour decisions distorted by a
23positive marginal rate of income tax. The new results depend crucially
on the assumptions one makes with regard to fertility determination. If
the number of children is taken to be exogenous, an extra birth should
reduce the net tax bill paid by the parents. That is not necessarily true,
however, if fertility is taken to be endogenous. As the di⁄erentiating
characteristic is then the couple￿ s ability to raise children, rather the
number of children, the more able parents should have more children,
and get larger per-child subsidies, than the less able parents. If a child￿ s
chances in life are positively a⁄ected by some unobservable parental ac-
tion (e.g., time and money spent on the child), the subsidy should be
made contingent on some predictor of the child￿ s future earning and tax-
paying capacity. If the child￿ s educational record is a good predictor of
this capacity, we may interpret the subsidy as a scholarship.13 Other-
wise, it may be better to rely on the child￿ s actual work and tax-paying
record up to a certain date. For this to be reliable, however, the date
should be set as late as possible (say, when the child is in middle life, and
the parents are on the point of retirement), and it then comes natural
to interpret the subsidy as a pension entitlement for the parents.14
6 References
Atkinson, A. and J. Stiglitz (1976), The design of tax structure: direct
versus indirect taxation, Journal of Public Economics 6, 55-75.
Balestrino, A., Cigno, A. and A. Pettini (2002), Endogenous fertility
and the design of family taxation, International Tax and Public Finance
9, 175-193
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , Cigno, A. and A. Pettini (2003), Doing wonders with an
egg: optimal re-distribution when households di⁄er in market and non-
market abilities, Journal of Public Economic Theory 5, 479-498
Becker, G. (1991), A Treatise on the Family (2nd enlarged edition),
Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass.
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿and R. J. Barro (1988), A Reformulation of the economic
theory of fertility, Quarterly Journal of Economics 103, 1-25
Bovemberg, A. L. and B. Jacobs (2005), Redistribution and edu-
cation subsidies are Siamese twins, Journal of Public Economics 89,
2005-2035
Cigno, A. (1986), Fertility and the tax-bene￿t system: a reconsider-
ation of the theory of family taxation, Economic Journal 96, 1035￿ 1051
13For a model of university scholarships along these lines, see Cigno and Luporini
(2009a).
14Not for the children, because it is the parents who make the hidden eductional
investment which the government wants to encourage. For an actual policy proposal
based on this idea, see Cigno (2009).
24￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(1993), Intergenerational transfers without altruism: family,
market and state, European Journal of Political Economy 9, 505-518
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(2001), Comparative advantage, observability, and the opti-
mal tax treatment of families with children, International Tax and Public
Finance 8, 455-470
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (2006), A constitutional theory of the family, Journal of
Population Economics 19, 259-283
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿(2009), How to avoid a pension crisis. A question of intelli-
gent mechanism design, CESifo WP 2590
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and A. Luporini (2006), Optimal policy towards families
with di⁄erent amounts of social capital, in the presence of asymmetric
information and stochastic fertility, CESifo WP 1664
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ and A. Luporini (2009a), Scholarships or student loans?
Subsidizing higher education in the presence of moral hazard, Journal
of Public Economic Theory 11, 55-87
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿and A. Luporini (2009b), Optimal family policy in the pres-
ence of moral hazard, when the quantity and quality of children are
stochastic, IZA DP 4179
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , Luporini, A. and A. Pettini (2003), Transfers to families
with children as a principal-agent problem, Journal of Public Economics
87, 1165-1177
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , Luporini, A. and A. Pettini (2004), Hidden information
problems in the design of family allowances, Journal of Population Eco-
nomics 17, 645-655
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿and A. Pettini (2003), Taxing family size and subsidizing
child-speci￿c commodities? Journal of Public Economics 87, 75-90
Cremer, H., Dellis, A. and P. Pestieau (2003), Family size and opti-
mal income taxation, Journal of Population Economics 16, 37-54
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , Gahvari, F. and P. Pestieau (2006), Pensions with endoge-
nous and stochastic fertility, Journal of Public Economics 90, 2303-2321
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ , Gahvari, F. and P. Pestieau (2008), Pensions with heteroge-
neous agents and endogenous fertility, Journal of Population Economics
21, 961-981
Edwards, J., Keen, M. and M. Tuomala (1994), Income tax, com-
modity taxes and public good provision: a brief guide, FinanzArchiv,
51, 472-487
Hellwig, M. (2008), A generalization of the Atkinson-Stiglitz (1976)
theorem on the undesirability of nonuniform excise taxation, Max Planck
Institute for Research on Collective Goods Preprints 2008/47
Milgrom, P., 1981, Good news and bad news: representation theo-
rems and applications, Bell Journal of Economics 12, 380-391
Mirrlees, J. A. (1971), An exploration into the theory of optimal
25income taxation, Review of Economic Studies, 38, 175-208
￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ (1974), Notes on welfare economics, information and
uncertainty, in Balch M.S., McFadden D. L. and S. Y. Wu (eds.) Essays
on Economic Behavior and Uncertainty, North-Holland, Amsterdam.
Nava, M., Schroyen, F. and M. Marchand (1996), Optimal ￿scal
and public expenditure policy in a two-class economy, Journal of Public
Economics 61, 119-137
Nerlove, M., Razin, A. and E. Sadka (1993), Children as capital
goods or a base for income redistribution policies, Public Finance 48,
78-84
Sandmo, A. (1990), Tax distortions and household production, Ox-
ford Economic Papers 42, 78-90
Seade, J. (1982), On the sign of the optimum marginal income tax,
Review of Economic Studies 49, 637-643
26CESifo Working Paper Series 
for full list see Twww.cesifo-group.org/wpT 
(address: Poschingerstr. 5, 81679 Munich, Germany, office@cesifo.de) 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
 
2601 Ana B. Ania and Andreas Wagener, The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as an 
Evolutionary Learning Process, April 2009 
 
2602 Simon Gächter, Daniele Nosenzo, Elke Renner and Martin Sefton, Sequential versus 
Simultaneous Contributions to Public Goods: Experimental Evidence, April 2009 
 
2603 Philippe Jehiel and Andrew Lilico, Smoking Today and Stopping Tomorrow: A Limited 
Foresight Perspective, April 2009 
 
2604 Andreas Knabe, Steffen Rätzel, Ronnie Schöb and Joachim Weimann, Dissatisfied with 
Life, but Having a Good Day: Time-Use and Well-Being of the Unemployed, April 
2009 
 
2605 David Bartolini and Raffaella Santolini, Fiscal Rules and the Opportunistic Behaviour 
of the Incumbent Politician: Evidence from Italian Municipalities, April 2009 
 
2606 Erkki Koskela and Jan König, Can Profit Sharing Lower Flexible Outsourcing? A Note, 
April 2009 
 
2607 Michel Beine, Frédéric Docquier and Çağlar Özden, Diasporas, April 2009 
 
2608 Gerd Ronning and Hans Schneeweiss, Panel Regression with Random Noise, April 
2009 
 
2609 Adam S. Booij, Bernard M.S. van Praag and Gijs van de Kuilen, A Parametric Analysis 
of Prospect Theory’s Functionals for the General Population, April 2009 
 
2610 Jeffrey R. Brown, Julia Lynn Coronado and Don Fullerton, Is Social Security Part of the 
Social Safety Net?, April 2009 
 
2611 Ali Bayar and Bram Smeets, Economic, Political and Institutional Determinants of 
Budget Deficits in the European Union, April 2009 
 
2612 Balázs Égert, The Impact of Monetary and Commodity Fundamentals, Macro News and 
Central Bank Communication on the Exchange Rate: Evidence from South Africa, April 
2009 
 
2613 Michael Melvin, Christian Saborowski, Michael Sager and Mark P. Taylor, Bank of 
England Interest Rate Announcements and the Foreign Exchange Market, April 2009 
 
2614 Marie-Louise Leroux, Pierre Pestieau and Gregory Ponthiere, Should we Subsidize 
Longevity?, April 2009 
 
2615 Ronald MacDonald, Lukas Menkhoff and Rafael R. Rebitzky, Exchange Rate 
Forecasters’ Performance: Evidence of Skill?, April 2009  
2616 Frederick van der Ploeg and Steven Poelhekke, The Volatility Curse: Revisiting the 
Paradox of Plenty, April 2009 
 
2617 Axel Dreher, Peter Nunnenkamp, Hannes Öhler and Johannes Weisser, Acting 
Autonomously or Mimicking the State and Peers? A Panel Tobit Analysis of Financial 
Dependence and Aid Allocation by Swiss NGOs, April 2009 
 
2618 Guglielmo Maria Caporale, Roman Matousek and Chris Stewart, Rating Assignments: 
Lessons from International Banks, April 2009 
 
2619 Paul Belleflamme and Martin Peitz, Asymmetric Information and Overinvestment in 
Quality, April 2009 
 
2620 Thomas Dohmen, Armin Falk, David Huffman and Uwe Sunde, Are Risk Aversion and 
Impatience Related to Cognitive Ability?, April 2009 
 
2621 Yin-Wong Cheung and Xingwang Qian, The Empirics of China’s Outward Direct 
Investment, April 2009 
 
2622 Frédérique Bec and Christian Gollier, Assets Returns Volatility and Investment 
Horizon: The French Case, April 2009 
 
2623 Ronnie Schöb and Marcel Thum, Asymmetric Information Renders Minimum Wages 
Less Harmful, April 2009 
 
2624 Martin Ruf and Alfons J. Weichenrieder, The Taxation of Passive Foreign Investment – 
Lessons from German Experience, April 2009 
 
2625 Yao Li, Borders and Distance in Knowledge Spillovers: Dying over Time or Dying with 
Age? – Evidence from Patent Citations, April 2009 
 
2626 Jim Malley and Ulrich Woitek, Technology Shocks and Aggregate Fluctuations in an 
Estimated Hybrid RBC Model, April 2009 
 
2627 Jin Cao and Gerhard Illing, Endogenous Systemic Liquidity Risk, April 2009 
 
2628 Thiess Buettner and Bjoern Kauder, Revenue Forecasting Practices: Differences across 
Countries and Consequences for Forecasting Performance, April 2009 
 
2629 Håkan Selin, The Rise in Female Employment and the Role of Tax Incentives – An 
Empirical Analysis of the Swedish Individual Tax Reform of 1971, April 2009 
 
2630 Nick Johnstone and Ivan Hascic, Environmental Policy Design and the Fragmentation 
of International Markets for Innovation, April 2009 
 
2631 Spiros Bougheas, Richard Kneller and Raymond Riezman, Optimal Education Policies 
and Comparative Advantage, April 2009 
 
2632 Jay Pil Choi and Heiko Gerlach, Multi-Market Collusion with Demand Linkages and 
Antitrust Enforcement, April 2009  
2633 Thor O. Thoresen, Income Mobility of Owners of Small Businesses when Boundaries 
between Occupations are Vague, April 2009 
 
2634 Guido Schwerdt and Amelie C. Wuppermann, Is Traditional Teaching really all that 
Bad? A Within-Student Between-Subject Approach, April 2009 
 
2635 Kurt R. Brekke, Luigi Siciliani and Odd Rune Straume, Hospital Competition and 
Quality with Regulated Prices, April 2009 
 
2636 Peter Diamond, Taxes and Pensions, April 2009 
 
2637 Shoshana Grossbard, How “Chicagoan” are Gary Becker’s Economic Models of 
Marriage?, May 2009 
 
2638 Roland Strausz, Regulatory Risk under Optimal Incentive Regulation, May 2009 
 
2639 Holger Zemanek, Ansgar Belke and Gunther Schnabl, Current Account Imbalances and 
Structural Adjustment in the Euro Area: How to Rebalance Competitiveness, May 2009 
 
2640 Harald Hau and Marcel Thum, Subprime Crisis and Board (In-)Competence: Private vs. 
Public Banks in Germany, May 2009 
 
2641 Martin Halla, Mario Lackner and Friedrich G. Schneider, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Dynamics of the Welfare State: The Case of Benefit Morale, May 2009 
 
2642 Balázs Égert, Infrastructure Investment in Network Industries: The Role of Incentive 
Regulation and Regulatory Independence, May 2009 
 
2643 Christian Gollier, Expected Net Present Value, Expected Net Future Value, and the 
Ramsey Rule, May 2009 
 
2644 Sören Blomquist and Håkan Selin, Hourly Wage Rate and Taxable Labor Income 
Responsiveness to Changes in Marginal Tax Rates, May 2009 
 
2645 Dominique Demougin, Oliver Fabel and Christian Thomann, Implicit vs. Explicit 
Incentives: Theory and a Case Study, May 2009 
 
2646 Francesco C. Billari and Vincenzo Galasso, What Explains Fertility? Evidence from 
Italian Pension Reforms, May 2009 
 
2647 Kjell Arne Brekke, Karen Evelyn Hauge, Jo Thori Lind and Karine Nyborg, Playing 
with the Good Guys – A Public Good Game with Endogenous Group Formation, May 
2009 
 
2648 Guglielmo Maria Caporale and Luis A. Gil-Alana, Multi-Factor Gegenbauer Processes 
and European Inflation Rates, May 2009 
 
2649 Henning Bohn, A Static Model for Voting on Social Security, May 2009 
 
2650 Markus Haavio and Kaisa Kotakorpi, The Political Economy of Sin Taxes, May 2009  
2651 Augusto de la Torre, María Soledad Martínez Pería and Sergio L. Schmukler, Drivers 
and Obstacles to Banking SMEs: The Role of Competition and the Institutional 
Framework, May 2009 
 
2652 Tobias Lindhe and Jan Södersten, Dividend Taxation, Share Repurchases and the 
Equity Trap, May 2009 
 
2653 Assaf Razin and Edith Sand, Migration-Regime Liberalization and Social Security: 
Political-Economy Effect, May 2009 
 
2654 Yin-Wong Cheung and Hiro Ito, A Cross-Country Empirical Analysis of International 
Reserves, May 2009 
 
2655 Bart Cockx and Bruno Van der Linden, Flexicurity in Belgium. A Proposal Based on 
Economic Principles, May 2009 
 
2656 Michael Melvin, Lukas Menkhoff and Maik Schmeling, Exchange Rate Management in 
Emerging Markets: Intervention via an Electronic Limit Order Book, May 2009 
 
2657 Susanne Neckermann, Reto Cueni and Bruno S. Frey, What is an Award Worth? An 
Econometric Assessment of the Impact of Awards on Employee Performance, May 
2009 
 
2658 Steven Brakman, Harry Garretsen and Charles van Marrewijk, Economic Geography 
within and between European Nations: The Role of Market Potential and Density across 
Space and Time, May 2009 
 
2659 Giovanni Facchini and Cecilia Testa, Reforming Legislatures: Is one House better than 
two?, May 2009 
 
2660 Carsten Kowalczyk and Raymond Riezman, Trade Agreements, May 2009 
 
2661 Oliver Falck, Stephan Heblich and Elke Luedemann, Identity and Entrepreneurship, 
May 2009 
 
2662 Christian Lessmann and Gunther Markwardt, One Size Fits All? Decentralization, 
Corruption, and the Monitoring of Bureaucrats, May 2009 
 
2663 Felix Bierbrauer, On the Legitimacy of Coercion for the Financing of Public Goods, 
May 2009 
 
2664 Alessandro Cigno, Agency in Family Policy: A Survey, May 2009 